

Tri-Service Assessment Initiative Phase 2 Systemic Analysis Results



***Conference on the Acquisition of Software Intensive Systems
January 28, 2003***


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Presentation Objectives

- ***Convey what we have learned through a systemic “Cross Program” analysis of multiple DoD software intensive programs***
- ***Describe and quantify the recurring issues that impact DoD software intensive program performance***
- ***Characterize the identified DoD program performance issues in terms of cause and effect***
- ***Initiate discussion on potential corrective action strategies***

Phase 2 Overarching Conclusion

The analysis predicts an increasing gap between what is expected and what is capable of being achieved




Summary Findings

- ***Software intensive system development issues are still pervasive across DoD programs***
- ***New emerging issues reflect complex, risk-prone acquisition trends. These include:***
 - ***interoperability / family of systems***
 - ***co-dependent systems development***
 - ***“mission resilient”, evolutionary system development***
 - ***direct funding - Congressional plus-ups***
 - ***expanded contractor acquisition and program management responsibilities***
 - ***acquisition policy easements***

What You Need to Know

- ***The causes of program performance shortfalls are extremely complex - improvement strategies and associated action plans must address this complexity***
- ***As an Enterprise we need to start by re-addressing the performance issues we thought we were already fixing***
- ***The longer we wait - the higher the risk***

Tri Service Assessment Initiative



- ***Independent Expert Program Reviews***
- ***Single Program Focus***
- ***Objective - Improve Program Performance***
- ***Program Team Insight***

- ***Cross-Program Analysis***
- ***Enterprise Focus***
- ***Objective - Identify and Characterize Recurring Performance Issues***
- ***General and Directed Analyses***
- ***Enterprise Manager Insight***

Both Activities are Based on an Integrated Assessment Architecture

Systemic Analysis Phases

Phase 1 - Complete July 2001

- ***Top down analysis approach***
- ***Initial models - proof of concepts***
- ***Assessment architecture integration***
- ***Initial data set - 10 assessments***


Phase 2 - Complete December 2002

- ***Bottom up analysis approach***
- ***Based on quantification of recurring issues and sequences***
- ***Information driven analysis objectives***
- ***Systemic database***
- ***Extended data set - 23 assessments***


Phase 3 - Began January 2003

- ***Predictive issue pattern analysis***
- ***Quantification of projected issue impacts***
- ***Architecture and analysis process improvements***
- ***Comprehensive transition program***


Assessment Distribution



***Distribution of Assessments
by Service***



***Distribution of Assessments
by ACAT Level***



***Distribution of Assessments
by Domain***

Systemic Analysis Process

Program Assessment Results

**Analyze
Assessment Findings**

- ***Systemic Peer Review***
- ***Assessment Characterization***
- ***Issue Identification***
- ***Risk Typology Allocations***
- ***Initial Cause and Effect Model***

**Basic
Analysis**

- ***Issue Frequency of Occurrence Analysis - Data Normalization***
- ***Enterprise - Program Issue Responsibility Allocations***
- ***Definition of Information Needs***
- ***Issue Concurrency Analysis***
- ***Issue Sequence Identification and Analysis - Interaction***
- ***Issue Characterization - Triggers / Symptoms***

**Directed
Analysis**

- ***Executive Data Call***
- ***Basic Analysis Review***
- ***Definition - Prioritization of Information Needs***
- ***Individual Case Analysis***


**Integrated
Analysis**

- ***Issue Correlation***
- ***Risk Analysis***
- ***External Correlations***
- ***Systemic Analysis Model***
- ***Executive Level Conclusions / Summary***


Action Plan

What Was Counted

- ***Identified Issues***
 - ***single issues***
 - ***composite issues***
 - ***component issues***
- ***Systemic Sequences***
- ***Systemic Patterns***
- ***Triggers and Symptoms***



Issue Structure



Systemic Issue Pattern


Basic Analysis

Critical program performance problems

<i>Identified Issues</i>	<i>Relative Occurrence</i>
<i>Process Capability</i>	<i>91 %</i>
<i>Organizational Management</i>	<i>87 %</i>
<i>Requirements Management</i>	<i>87 %</i>
<i>Product Testing</i>	<i>83 %</i>
<i>Program Planning</i>	<i>74 %</i>
<i>Product Quality - Rework</i>	<i>70 %</i>
<i>System Engineering</i>	<i>61 %</i>
<i>Process Compliance</i>	<i>52 %</i>
<i>Program Schedule</i>	<i>48 %</i>
<i>Interoperability</i>	<i>43 %</i>
<i>Decision Making</i>	<i>43 %</i>
<i>...</i>	
<i>Configuration Management</i>	<i>26%</i>


Basic Analysis

Complex issues with multiple interactions across all levels of DoD management



Issue Migration

Sequence Starts - Start Responsibility by Next Responsibility



Basic Analysis

The primary causative performance issues are:

- ***Process capability shortfalls: the inability of the program team to design, integrate, and implement processes that adequately support the needs of the program***
- ***Requirements development and management shortfalls***
- ***Organizational management and communication limitations***
- ***Stakeholder agendas and related program changes***
- ***Product architecture deficiencies***

Cause and Effect Impacts

- ***Process Capability problems result in:***
 - ***Inadequate Testing***
 - ***Poor Change Management***
 - ***Poor Product Quality***
 - ***Progress Shortfalls***
- ***Requirements Management problems result in:***
 - ***Poor Product Quality***
 - ***Product Rework***
 - ***Progress Shortfalls***
- ***Organizational and Program Management problems result in:***
 - ***Inadequate Program Planning***
 - ***Responsibility Conflicts***
 - ***Poor Communications***
 - ***Product Rework***
 - ***Progress Shortfalls***

Basic Analysis

Under pressure, Program Managers make trade-off decisions that impact, in order:

- ***Development progress***
- ***Product technical performance***
- ***Product quality and rework***
- ***System usability***
- ***Cost***

Basic Analysis Summary

- ***The current DoD program issue profile shows little positive impact from past corrective actions, initiatives, and policy***
- ***The Program Manager and the Development Team must address the majority of the program issues, even if they are caused by enterprise level decisions or behaviors***
- ***Causative issues multiply downstream***
- ***The Program Team creates many of their own performance problems***
- ***There are no “single issue” program performance drivers***

Directed Analysis

- ***Software Engineering Process***
- ***Systems Engineering***
- ***Software Testing***
- ***Program Organization and Communication***

Software Engineering Process

Analysis Results

- ***91% of the assessments had process capability issues (75% triggers)***
- ***52% of the assessments had process compliance issues (63% triggers)***
- ***Predominant deficiencies: requirements, risk / measurement, testing, systems engineering, change management***

Implications

- ***The performance problem extends beyond developer software process compliance***
- ***False assumption that organizational process compliance equates to required program process capability***
- ***Compliant organizations still have significant performance shortfalls***
- ***Key process concerns:***
 - a. ***focus is too narrow in scope***
 - b. ***impacts of program constraints***
 - c. ***large program team process incompatibilities***
 - d. ***program teams just not good enough***

Systems Engineering

Analysis Results

- ***61% of the assessments had systems engineering issues (23% triggers)***
- ***11 of the 16 programs that have requirements issues have SE issues***
- ***43% of the assessments have interoperability issues (50% triggers)***
- ***Predominant deficiencies: Non-existent SE, lack of SE expertise, poor SE implementation, dispersion of SE responsibility and authority, existing SE inadequate for program requirements***

Implications

- ***Cost overruns, schedule slips and rework will continue to plague programs***
- ***The most technically complex systems have the most systems engineering issues***
- ***Interoperability of systems is in doubt***
- ***Rapid exploitation of new/innovative technology is difficult***

Systems Engineering Findings

- ***DoD programs have significant shortfalls with respect to systems engineering yet this is where most of the identified program issues exist***
- ***“Systems engineering by committee” is both common and ineffective***
- ***Programs continuously face unfunded and unplanned mandates related to family of systems management and interoperability***
- ***Trade off decisions are often extremely constrained***

Systems engineering must take a primary and renewed role in today's DoD programs

Software Testing

Analysis Results

- ***83% of the assessments had testing related issues (53% triggers)***
- ***Predominant deficiencies: lack of test time, facilities, testing cutbacks, poor test procedures***
- ***73% of the programs with schedule problems had testing issues***
- ***80% of the programs with requirements problems had testing issues***

Implications

- ***Overarching testing risk - late discovery of defects (94%)***
- ***Most testing issues result in quality shortfalls and rework***
- ***Testing of complex systems is an emerging concern***
- ***Primary causes of testing shortfalls:***
 - a. ***requirements (71%)***
 - b. ***test facilities (71%)***
 - c. ***test process capability (65%)***
 - d. ***schedule constraints (41%)***

Program Organization and Communication


Analysis Results

- **87% of the assessments had communications issues (65% triggers)**
- **Every program with IPT related issues had communications issues**
- **Predominant deficiencies: unclear roles and responsibilities, delayed decision making, conflicting decisions, proprietary information (all exacerbated by widely dispersed organizational teams and complex organizational structures not suited for traditional management approaches)**

Implications

- **IPTs appear to create more management issues than they resolve**
- **Poor implementation of IPTs: proliferation, structure, membership, authority and decision responsibility issues**

Systemic Analysis Model



New Solution Strategy Required?

- ***Past DoD acquisition solutions (strategies, policies, and initiatives) have had only limited success in reversing poor performance trends:***
 - ***Single point solutions***
 - ***Poorly evaluated***
 - ***Focused on symptoms not causes***
 - ***Lacking in implementation guidance***
 - ***Conflicting***
 - ***Volatile***
 - ***Lack insight into solution effectiveness***
 - ***Long lasting impacts and residuals***

Key Considerations

- ***Need to establish performance parameters that can be implemented with success across the life of the program***
 - ***Feasible plan***
 - ***Understood constraints***
 - ***Change tolerance***
- ***Need to improve the capabilities of the development teams***
 - ***Real systems engineering***
 - ***Funded management and technical approaches critical to interoperability***
 - ***Foundational processes***

Key Considerations

- ***Need to ensure that all program stakeholders agree on an integrated strategy for attacking the high priority overarching program issues***
 - ***Congress and enterprise***
 - ***Program team***
 - ***Education and technology infrastructures***
- ***Need to augment recent acquisition policy changes with***
 - ***A clear understanding of the complex interactions and constraints that programs are faced with***
 - ***Adequate implementation guidance***
 - ***Directed education***

Assessment & Analysis Essentials

- ***Focus on performance improvement***
- ***Enterprise performance is a composite of project performance***
- ***Use a common architecture for project and systemic evaluation***
- ***Address a wide scope of issues and issue sources***
- ***Risk management and measurement processes are critical***
- ***Flexibility is important – typology not taxonomy***
- ***Relate subjective and quantitative information***
- ***Information needs drive the analysis process***
- ***Frequency of occurrence counts are just the first step***
- ***Data integrity – data integrity – data integrity***
- ***Consistent terminology***

Tri-Service Assessment Initiative™

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